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Casenote
Carpenter v. United States: Securities
Trading, Mail Fraud and Confidential
Business Information-New Liability for
Outsiders?
In Carpenter v. United States,1 the federal government sought civil
and criminal sanctions against a Wall Street Journal (Journal) reporter
who sold the contents of his stock analysis column before publication
in the Journal. 2 The reporter was not a fiduciary of any corporation
and his column contained no inside information? Nevertheless, the
District Court of New York found that the reporter and his co-
conspirators violated Rule lOb-5, 4 section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
1. 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). David Carpenter was a co-conspirator in the scheme and was
one of three petitioners in the appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. at 318.
2. Id. at 319.
3. Id. at 319-20. Although the information sold was not inside information in the traditional
sense, it was confidential information and the reporter was well aware of the column's direct
impact upon the market price of the stocks analyzed. Id.
4. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1987). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
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change Act of 1934, 5 and the federal wire and mail fraud statutes. 6
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the reporter's con-
victions under Rule lOb-5 holding that his misappropriation of con-
fidential information from his employer violated the intent of the
securities laws. 7 The Court of Appeals also affirmed the reporter's
wire and mail fraud convictions for defrauding the Journal of intan-
gible property.8
In the face of much anticipation surrounding its opinion, the United
States Supreme Court divided evenly on whether the misappropriation
theory9 was sufficient to support a violation of Rule lOb-5.10 The
Court, however, unanimously upheld the reporter's wire and mail
fraud conviction. 1 The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that
the reporter breached a fiduciary duty to his employer by defrauding
the Journal of its intangible property rights to confidential business
information. 12
The Supreme Court's lack of a definitive decision on the merits of
the misappropriation theory casts significant doubt on the theory's
continued viability."3 Additionally, the Court's application of the wire
and mail fraud statutes to theft of confidential information raises
questions regarding the type of property the statutes protect and, in
conjunction with other federal statutes, could expand the remedies
available to a defrauded party.14
Part I of this note will trace briefly the evolution of Rule 10b-5
and the misappropriation theory.'5 Additionally, Part I will examine
the history and development of the wire and mail fraud statutes.' 6
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
Id.
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
6. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 319.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The misappropriation theory applies lOb-5 liability to persons who trade on nonpublicinformation in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the person or persons who entrusted theinformation to the fiduciary. LmEVOORRT, INSIDER TAnN REGULATION, 177 (1988).10. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320. The Court's opinion reads: "The Court is evenly divided
with respect to the convictions under the securities law and for that reason affirms the judgement
of the court below on those counts." Id.
11. Id. at 321.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text (discussion of merits and criticisms of
misappropriation theory under Rule lOb-5).
14. See infra notes 181-205 and accompanying text (discussion of remedies for defrauded
party under wire and mail fraud statutes).
15. See infra notes 19-76 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 77-104 and accompanying text.
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Part II will summarize the facts of the Carpenter case and review the
decision of the United States Supreme Court. 17 Part III will discuss
the potential legal ramifications of Carpenter and its impact under
civil RICO. 8
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The History of Rule 10b-5
Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) makes it
unlawful to defraud or engage in fraudulent business practices in
connection with the purchase and sale of securities. 9 In interpreting
this statute, courts initially developed the "disclose or abstain" rule.?
That rule requires traditional insiders21-typically those with a fiduciary
relationship to a corporation-either to disclose publicly any materialP
nonpublic information regarding corporate assets or to abstain from
trading on that information. However, until recently, the disclose or
abstain rule did not apply unless the trading party owed a duty to the
shareholders of the corporation whose stock was traded.Y
17. See infra notes 105-155 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 156-205 and accompanying text.
19. See 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (1987) (text of Rule 10b-5). See also supra note 4.
20. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantanges Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HI-xv. L. Rnv. 322, 328-332 (1979) (history of the disclose or abstain rule).
21. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951) (holding that
"traditional insiders" are corporate officers, directors or majority shareholders).
22. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAIn. L. REv. 795, 800 n.17 (1983) (defining a fiduciary
relationship as one of trust and confidence where the unifying characteristics are a substitutionary
function, a delegation of power, and one parties dependence upon the other for a particular
service).
23. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988) (expressly adopting the standard
for materiality announced in TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). In TSC
Industries, the Court held that information is material "if there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." 426 U.S. at 449.
The TSC Industries Court further explained that to satisfy the materiality requirement "there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available." Id.
24. See Brudney, supra note 20, at 324-25 (insiders who possess information of a conse-
quential nature must either disclose it to all of the investing public or abstain from trading until
that information becomes public).
25. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 231-35 (1980). The Court in Chiarella held
that an employee of a printing firm had no fiduciary relationship with the shareholders from
whom he purchased stock; therefore, he had no duty to disclose before trading and did not
violate Rule 10(b)-5. Id.
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The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 26 to close a loophole in the
protection against fraud under section 10(b) of the Securities Act of
1934.27 As interpreted today, Rule lOb-5 makes unlawful the use of
any instrumentality of interstate commerce, the mails, or any national
exchange to employ fraudulent devices, make untrue statements, or
engage in fraudulent business practices in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.28
For almost twenty years after the enactment Rule lOb-5, courts
limited their analysis of insider trading29 to activities of traditional
corporate insiders, i.e., directors, officers, and controlling sharehold-
ers.30 Because of their position with the corporation, traditional insiders
were held to owe a fiduciary responsibility to the shareholders of the
corporation,. requiring them to adhere to the disclose or abstain rule."
Lower courts extended the disclose or abstain rule by placing liability
upon "anyone" who traded on material nonpublic information, re-
gardless of whether they owed a duty to the corporation. 2 In Chiarella
26. See Note, Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: Has the Second Circuit
Gone Too Far? 61 ST. Join's L. REv. 78, 86-89 (1986) (history of SEC and securities regulations).
Rule 10b-5 was created by the Securities Exchange Commission under the broad authoritydelegated by Congress to regulate securities trading and to protect the interests of public investors
against manipulation of the securities markets. Prior to 1942, the SEC had promulgated rules
under section 10(b) but these rules did not limit insider trading. Id.27. Id. at 88. See also A. BROiBmRG & L. LowENm'ts, SEcURrMTS FRAUD AND CoMaMoDMrEs
FRAD § 2.2(510) (Oct. 1983 & Oct. 1979) (summary of rules under section 10(b)). Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ... To use or employ, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
28. Note, supra note 26, at 86-87.
29. LANGEvOORT, supra note 9, at 3-4. Insider trading is a term of art that refers to unlawfultrading in securities by persons who possess material nonpublic information about the company
whose shares are traded or the market for those shares. The term insider trading can be a
misnomer because modernly the prohibition against this kind of trading applies to a larger class
of persons than those traditionally considered to be corporate insiders. The term is often used
to refer to anyone who has access to privliged information. Additionally there is circularity to
the definition as the term is used only to refer to trading that is unlawful. There are numerous
instances in which people who possess material nonpublic information can trade lawfully. Only
after reaching a legal conclusion, then can the applicability of the term be defined. Id.
30. Note, supra note 26, at 90.
31. Id. at 89-90.
32. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (Rule lOb-5 restricts the trading
activities of "any person" who has a relationship that allows access to material nonpublic
information). See also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951)(extending fiduciary duties to majority shareholders); New Park Mining Co. v. Cramer, 225 F.
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v. United States33 the Supreme Court rejected this extention of lOb-
5 liability to "any person" and reaffirmed the traditional theory that
lOb-5 liability arises only from a breach of fiduciary duty or other
special relationship.3
4
In Dirks v. SEC,35 the Supreme Court further developed the lOb-5
fiduciary duty doctrine by deciding the liability of a stock "tippee.
3 6
The Court held that a tippee violates Rule lOb-5 if (1) an insider
breaches a fiduciary duty to the corporation's shareholders by divulging
material nonpublic information to the tippee, (2) the tippee knew or
should have known that the breach occurred, and (3) the tippee trades
on the information. 37 Dirks was an investment analyst who analyzed
insurance company securities. 38 He received information from a former
officer of an insurance company that the company had fraudulently
Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (corporation allowed to sue former officers and directors, thus
relaxing privity requirements under Rule lOb-5); Pettit v. American Stock Exch. 217 F. Supp.
21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (suit permitted against wide variety of persons accused of defrauding an
issuer of stock).
33. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
34. Id. at 224-225. Chiarella was employed as a mark-up man for a financial printer and,
in the course of his employment, printed announcements of takeover bids. While the announce-
ments concealed the names of the acquiring and target companies with blank spaces or code
names, Chiarella was able to deduce the true names of the companies. Without disclosing his
knowledge of this information, Chiarella purchased shares in-the target companies. The shares
were then sold when the takeover bids were made public, netting Chiarella over $30,000 in profit.
Chiarella was indicted on 17 counts of violating section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding the affirmative duty
to disclose or refrain was imposed upon anyone who received material nonpublic information,
and held those persons may not trade upon that information without prior full disclosure. Id.
at 231. While the Court of Appeals recognized that Chiarella was not a traditional insider, it
determined Chiarella was a "market insider" because of his continuing access to information
about target companies. Chiarella v. United States, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,
445 U.S. 222 (1979).
The Supreme Court reversed Chiarella's convictions, expressly rejecting the Second Circuit's
view that anyone receiving material nonpublic information could be burdened by an affirmative
duty to disclose. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. The Court instead affirmed the common law
underpinnings of section 10(b), holding the possession of material nonpublic information alone
imposes no obligation to disclose or refrain from trading. The disclose or refrain duty, the Court
held, arises only from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a business
transaction. Id. The Court also noted that use of nonpublic market information does not always
harm the market, as in the case of a securities specialist who contributes to market efficiency at
the same time they exploit the informational advantage. Id. at 233, n.16. Thus, under Chiarella,
a fiduciary relationship between the persons trading the securities and the shareholders of the
security bought or sold must exist before Rule lOb-5 can be violated.
35. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
36. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665. A "tippee" is a person who buys or is given nonpublic
information from an insider or a corporation when no one else is given that information. In re
Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 907. The theory holds that the insider by giving the information is gaining
from its selective release and taints the recipient such that he should no more be entitled to use
that information in trading than the donor. Brundey, supra note 20, at 348.
37. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659-61.
38. Id. at 658, n.18.
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overstated its assets.39 Dirks began investigating the allegations, but
throughout his investigation he openly discussed the allegations with
clients and friends. Many of these people sold their holdings in the
company's stock before the price declined in response to the circulating
rumors. 40 The SEC prosecuted Dirks for aiding and abetting those
who sold stock based on the nonpublic information. 41
The Supreme Court reversed Dirks' conviction. 42 The Court stated
that whether a tippee breaches a fiduciary duty depends upon the
purpose of the insider in disclosing the inside information. 4 The Court
found that Dirks was not liable under Rule 10b-5 because the insider
who gave Dirks the information had not breached a duty to the
corporation when he divulged the information." Since Dirks was not
a tippee under the Court's analysis, he could divulge the information
to others, with knowledge they would trade on it, without incurring
liability.4 However, the Dirks Court suggested the definition of "in-
sider" might be enlarged to include those who enter into a special
confidential relationship and who have access to confidential infor-
mation solely for a corporate purpose.4 Those persons become "con-
structive insiders" 47 and violate Rule lOb-5 when they use confidential
information in the sale or purchase of securities. 48
After Dirks, a violation of Rule lOb-5 requires that a tippee receive
material nonpublic information from an insider, or temporary insider,
who breaches a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the corporation
whose stock was traded by divulging the information. 41 In order to
39. Id. at 649.
40. Id. at 649-50. During the two weeks of Dirks' investigation, the price of the company's
stock fell from $26 to $15 per share. Id.
41. Id. at 650-51.
42. Id. at 667.
43. Id. at 663. The Court stated that the test is an objective one focusing on "whether theinsider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from disclosure." Id.44. Id. at 666-67. According to the Court, the corporate insider who revealed the information
to Dirks did so in order to expose the fraud and not to obtain any personal benefit. He therefore
did not breach a duty to the shareholders. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 655, n.14. "The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that suchpersons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they have entered into a special
confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to
information solely for corporate purposes." Id.
47. Persons who are considered constructive insiders include underwriters, accountants,
lawyers, or consultants working for the corporation. Id.48. Id. at 660. When a constructive insider breaches this fiduciary duty, however, the Court
may treat him as a tipper rather than a tippee. Id. at 655, n.14.
49. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 20 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S.863 (1983) (use of Rule lOb-5 and the wire and mail fraud statutes against employee who obtainedinside information about one of employer's clients and made trades on that information).
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prosecute individuals who owed no fiduciary duty to the corporation's
shareholders, but who traded on inside corporate information, the
SEC developed another definition of fiduciary duty.50
B. The Misappropriation Theory
In response to Dirks and Chiarella, the SEC began charging non-
insiders who traded on inside information under the "misappropriation
theory. '51 The theory imposes liability on anyone who trades on
corporate information gained through a confidential relationship.5
2 The
theory, based upon agency principles,53 provides that an employee has
a fiduciary duty not to exploit for personal gain confidential infor-
mation acquired in the course of employment.5 4 Therefore, an employee
who subsequently trades on the basis of this confidential information
violates Rule lOb-5 1 However, the misappropriation theory represents
a significant departure from early 10b-5 liability analysis because it
focuses upon the employee's fiduciary duty to an employer instead of
upon the duty owed to the shareholders of the corporation.56
While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the validity
of the misappropriation theory, 57 several members of the Chiarella
court expressed support for its use..8 Since Chiarella, the SEC has
50. See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
51. LANGEVOORT, supra note 9, at 177-79.
52. See Note, supra note 26, at 98-99.
53. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1985) (agent prohibited from using
confidential information for his own benefit).
54. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863
(1983) (employees guilty of securities fraud for breach of fiduciary duty to employer). The
misappropriation theory is based on the principal that one who trades on confidential information
acquired during the course of employment breaches a fiduciary duty to the employer and,
therefore, is guilty of securities fraud if the information is used to obtain personal gain from
the purchase or sale of securities. Note, The SEC's Regulation of the Financial Press: The Legal
Implications of the Misappropriation Theory, 52 BRooKLYN L. REv. 43, 54 (1978) (history of
the misappropriation theory).
55. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1033 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 316
(1987).
56. See generally Note, supra note 54, at 55.
57. LANoGEVOORT, supra note 9, at 177.
58. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 238-51 (1980). In a concurrence, Justice
Stevens indicated that the misappropriation theory could form the basis of an action for fraud
upon the acquiring corporations, but noted that they would be unable to recover damages since
they were neither buyers nor sellers of the traded securities. Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Brennan would have imposed liability on Chiarella on the theory
that anyone who misappropriates material nonpublic information has an affirmative duty to
either disclose or refrain from trading. Id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 238-39
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). While acknowledging the validity of the misappropriation
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successfully used the misappropriation theory against nontraditional
insiders in the federal courts.5 9 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
continues to approve use of the theory in cases in which liability
would not otherwise attach under an early lOb-5 analysis. 60 This
expanded application of the misappropriation theory is not without
controversy, however, and an evaluation of the criticisms of the
theory's application in securities fraud cases is important for deter-
mining its present viability. 61
C. Criticisms of the Misappropriation Theory
The use of the misappropriation theory to facilitate convictions
under Rule lOb-5 has prompted criticism as an unjustified expansion
of securities law. 62 Two related criticisms can trace their theoretical
origins from the early Rule lOb-5 case Sante Fe Industries v. Green.6
In Sante Fe, the Supreme Court held that a insider's breach of fiduciary
duty to the corporation's shareholders is not actionable under Rule
lOb-5 without a showing of actual deceit of the corporation's share-
theory, Justices Blackmun and Marshall would have upheld the conviction under a broadinterpretation of section 10(b) as prohibiting anyone from trading on the basis of materialinformation not legally available to the general investing public. Id. at 245-51 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
59. See United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (misappropriationtheory supported the indictment of a tippee even though he would not have been liable underDirks). See also Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985) (implicitly approving use
of misappropriation theory in an in pari delicto defense case).60. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S.863 (1983). The employees in Newman were trading on confidential information relating to
acquisition and tender offers of the banking firm's clients. Id. at 16. While the employees ofthe bank owed no duty to the corporations whose stocks were being traded, the employees didbreach a duty to their employers. According to the court, the employee's breach of confidentialityto their employer and subsequent trading satisfied the fiduciary relationship necessary for a lOb-
5 violation. Id.
See also SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984) (approving use of the theory
against an employee who obtained nonpublic information through deduction), cert. denied, 474U.S. 1053 (1985). Materia, like Chiarella, traded on confidential information acquired throughhis employment with a financial printing firm. 745 F.2d at 203. While Materia owed no fiduciaryduty to those corporations whose stock was traded, the court stated that violating the promise
of confidentiality to his employer was a significant breach of his fiduciary obligation. Id.61. Compare Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading onNonpublic Information, 13 HorsTRa L. REv. 101, 102 (1984) (arguing the misappropriationtheory is a valid method for curbing securities fraud) with Phillips & Zutz, The Insider TradingDoctrine: A Need for Legislative Repair, 13 Ho sTRA L. Rnv. 65, 91 (1984) (arguing the
misappropriation theory is an unjustified judicial expansion of securities law).62. See Phillips & Zutz, supra note 61, at 91 (1984) (arguing that the misappropriationtheory is a misconceived effort to broaden the insider trading doctrine); Note, supra note 26, at103-04 (concluding that the misappropriation theory conflicts with basic insider trading theories).
63. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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holders 4 The misappropriation theory is criticized by some commen-
tators as contrary to Sante Fe's purchase and sale requirement because
the theory imputes liability upon an employee for breach of fiduciary
duty to the employer without regard to whether the defrauded party,
the employer, actually traded in the corporation's securities. 65 Unlike
an insider, an employee only has a fiduciary duty to refrain from
using confidential information entrusted to him by the employer for
personal gain: a duty not related in any sense to the purchase or sale
of securities. 6
The second criticism based on the Sante Fe rationale concerns the
"in connection with" requirement. Under the misappropriation theory,
the "in connection with the purchase or sale of securities" requirement
is met when the employee buys or sells stock, in contrast to Sante
Fe's holding that the defrauded party must be a buyer or seller. 67
Consequently, the breach of duty by an employee is not actual
deception of the corporation's shareholders, but a mere breach of
fiduciary duty to another outsider. Therefore, an employee who trades
on confidential information which is not inside corporate information
can not be said to have violated the intent of Rule 10b-5
. 6
Another criticism of the misappropriation theory arises from the
Supreme Court's holding in Dirks.69 Under Dirks, a tippee violates
Rule lOb-5 only if he receives inside information from a corporate
insider who breaches a duty to his corporation."0 Under the misappro-
priation theory, however, a non-insider violates Rule lOb-5 if he
breaches a fiduciary duty to his employer regardless of the source of
the information and regardless of whether the employer owes a duty
to the shareholders of the traded stock.71 Thus, the misappropriation
theory unjustifiably expands the Dirks standard to non-insiders who
trade on information regardless of its source simply because use of
the information violated an agreement to an employer. 72
64. Id. at 473-76.
65. See Phillips & Zutz, supra note 61, at 91; LArMEvOORT, supra note 9, at 184.
66. Phillips & Zutz, supra note 61, at 91. "Disclosure by the employee would aggravate the
breach of duty to the employer, not cure it." Id.
67. LANrEVOORT, supra note 9, at 204.
68. See Phillips & Zutz, supra note 61, at 91; LANGEVOORT, supra note 9, at 184.
69. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
70. Id. at 664.
71. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
72. See Phillips & Zutz, supra note 61, at 91 (arguing misappropriation cannot be properly
applied to nonfiduciaries because it does not satisfy the Dirks test requiring receipt of personal
benefit).
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Additionally, some commentators argue the misappropriation theory
shifts the focus of Rule lOb-5 from the protection of the investing
public to the protection of the employer reputation.73 Under the
misappropriation theory, an employer could use Rule 10b-5 to pros-
ecute an employee for theft of corporate information simply because
the employee purchased or sold stocks of an unrelated company.74
Federal prosecution of employees who steal business information will
allow employers to maintain a reputation of complete business confi-
dentiality at the expense ofthe government. Furthermore, the use of
the misappropriation theory in the prosecution of financial reporters
also may implicate first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
through government regulation of the financial press. 7S Theoretically,
the government could prosecute a financial reporter for releasing
confidential business information that would have a significant impact
on market price of stocks even though the information was accurate.7 6
C. The Wire and Mail Fraud Statutes
Although the SEC refers the majority of insider trading cases to
the Justice Department for prosecution under Rule 10b-5, federal
prosecutors also can bring actions for securities fraud under the wire
and mail fraud statutes. 77 Congress originally enacted the statutes to
allow criminal prosecution of anyone engaged in fraudulent activity
through the use of the mails.71 Today these statutes provide an
alternative method for prosecuting many types of fraud. 79
73. See, e.g., LANGEiVOORT, supra note 9, at 203 (arguing that protection of reputation is
not an appropriate goal of federal securities laws); Note, supra note 26, at 107-08 (stating that
role of securities laws is to protect investors hence the misappropriation theory is improperly
applied if used to protect reputation of employers).
74. Note, supra note 26, at 108.
75. See Note, Financial Reporters, the Securities Laws and the First Amendment: Where toDraw the Line, 53 FoRDHAm L. Rsv. 1035, 1051-54 (1985) (arguing that SEC enforcementproceedings have significant first amendment ramifications, including prior restraint and chilling
of speech). See also Note, supra note 54, at 107 n.118 (arguing that requiring a reporter todisclose or abstain from trading is a restraint on the editorial discretion of a reporter andpublisher not justified by the government's need to enforce securities laws).
76. Note, supra note 75, at 1053-54.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (1981) (defendant charged with violatinglOb-5 and the wire and mail fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1976), when he convertedinside information from his employer, an investment banking firm).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467U.S. 1226 (1984); United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 763-64 (8th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 417
U.S. 909 (1974) (criminal sanctions under mail fraud).
79. See Morano, The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J. MAsiHAL L. Rv. 45,
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The mail fraud statute and its companion wire fraud statute are
considered as first line defenses against new types of fraudulent
schemes until Congress is able to enact particularized legislation.
s0 The
wire and mail fraud statutes"1 each contain two elements which the
government must prove for prosecution.82 The first element requires
the purposeful use of the wire or mails to carry out some essential
step in the execution of a fraudulent scheme." Purposeful use of the
mails occurs anytime the defendant acts with knowledge that use of
46-48 (1980). The original mail fraud statutes were enacted in 1872 with other legislation that
extended federal authority over powers once reserved to the states. Id. See also Rakoff, The
Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 18 DuQ. L. R-v. 771 (1980).'The statute's purpose was to prevent
the post office from being used as a tool to carry out fraudulent schemes. As was the norm for
post-civil war legislation, the mail fraud statute was written in broad language suggesting Congress
intended it to have versatile applications against schemes to defraud. Id. at 782.
80. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-408 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). One
commentator has criticized the sweeping judicial application of the statutes, stating the courts
were using the statutes "as a procrustean bed to fit virtually any conduct by defendants accused
of a wide variety of deception." Morano, supra note 79, at 47.
In Greek mythology, Procrustes invited travelers to spend the night as his guests.
Procrustes was, however, far from an ideal host. Once he had succeeded in overpow-
ering his unsuspecting guest, he forced him to lie on an iron bed and then robbed
him. But worse than the robbery was Procrustes' practice of either stretching out or
lopping off the legs of his victims to make their bodies conform to the length of the
bed.
Id. at 47, n.3.
81. Title 18, section 1343 of the United States Code provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, of
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio,
or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs,
signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall
be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). Title 18, section 1341 of the United States Code provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, represen-
tations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute,
supply or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin,
obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be intimated or held
out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository
for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal
Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes
to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it
is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or
thing shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or
both.
Id. § 1341.
82. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954). The wire fraud statute is nearly identical
in wording to the mail fraud statute, except that, instead of the requisite mailing the wire fraud
statute requires some interstate or international communication by means of wire, radio or
television. Cases construing the mail fraud statute apply to the wire fraud statute as well. Lemire,
720 F.2d at 1335 n.6; United States v. Donahue, 539 F.2d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1976).
83. Pereira, 347 U.S. at 8-9.
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the mails will follow in the reasonably foreseeable course of the
transaction8 4
The second element requires the government to prove the existence
of some artifice or unlawful scheme to defraud another of money or
property.8 5 To determine whether a scheme is unlawful, courts will
look to commonly accepted moral standards and will condemn conduct
which fails to match the reflection of moral uprightness and fair play.86
Immoral conduct alone, however, will not constitute a violation of
the wire and mail fraud statutes without a showing of specific intent
to defraud. Additionally, a conviction may result under the wire and
mail fraud statutes regardless of whether the unlawful scheme is
successful.88
The breach of a fiduciary duty can constitute a scheme to defraud
within the meaning of the wire and mail fraud statutes.8 9 Courts have
held that violations of mall fraud statutes occur when an employee
deprives his employer of honest and faithful services.90 However,
breach of fiduciary duty standing alone does not constitute wire or
mail fraud.91 Instead, courts have held that the wire and mail fraud
statutes protect against breaches of fiduciary duty that result in some
loss to the injured party.92 However, the types of property that must
be lost before a court will find a wire and mail fraud violation remain
unsettled. 93
84. Id.
85. U.S. v. Beistcher, 467 F.2d. 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1972).
86. See Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967) (crime of mail fraud
broadly construed and can be measured by a nontechnical standard). See also Hammerschmidt
v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) (words to defraud in mail fraud statute have common
understanding of wronging one of property rights by dishonest methods, trickery or deceit).
87. United States v. Sparrow, 470 F.2d. 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1972). While fraudulent intent
need not be directly related to the mailing element, prosecutors must prove fraudulent intent
either through circumstantial evidence or through the actions of a codefendant. United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1007 (D. Md. 1976). See also Note, Survey of the Mail Fraud Statute,
8 Mlai. ST. U.L. REv. 673, 678 (1978).
88. See United States v. Meyers, 359 F.2d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 1966) (since sections 1341 and
1343 read "scheme to defraud" and not "have committed fraud" success is not an element of
wire or mail fraud).
89. United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827(1973); Epstein v. United States, 174 F.2d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 1949).
90. See United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1980) (defendants were insurance
agents); United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976)
(defendant was a purchasing agent).
91. See United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 1983).
92. Id.
93. Compare United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3rd Cir. 1984) (only tangible
property covered by mail fraud statute) with United States v. States, 448 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir.
1973) (intangible property protected by wire and mail fraud statute).
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Many courts construed the statutory prohibitions against a scheme
to defraud and the requirement for property loss as independant
because these two elements appear in the disjunctive.94 Under this
approach, anyone could be convicted for wire or mail fraud if the
scheme attempted to deprive citizens of intangible political or civil
rights or if the scheme involved a breach of a fiduciary duty. 95
Recently, the Supreme Court limited use of the wire and mail fraud
statutes to schemes involving loss of property rights. In McNally v.
United States,91 the Supreme Court determined that the wire and mail
fraud statutes did not extend to protect the intangible rights of citizens
to good government. 97 McNally and a public official, Gray, took part
in a conspiracy whereby they and other conspirators would indirectly
receive a portion of the commissions paid to Kentucky's insurance
agent in exchange for the continued use of the agent to obtain the
state's insurance policies. 98 McNally and Gray were convicted on
charges of mail fraud and conspiracy under an instruction to the jury
that mail fraud included acts which deprive the citizens of the intangible
right to honest and faithful government. 99
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions as improper in view of
the legislative history of the statutes. 100 The Court held that the wire
and mail fraud statutes clearly protect property rights, but do not
mention the intangible right of the citizenry to honest and faithful
94. See, e.g., Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152; States, 488 F.2d at 764.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1987) (county judge convicted
for scheme to deprive citizens of intangible rights); United Staes v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th
Cir. 1979) (Governor of Maryland, same); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.
1940) cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941) (parish levy board member, same); United States v.
Curry, 681 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1982) (political action committee chairman convicted for breach
of fiduciary duty); United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980) (securities trader,
same); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1980) (insurance manager, same).
96. 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987).
97. Id. at 2881.
98. Id. at 2878. The official was in charge of selecting insurance carriers for the state. The
scheme provided that excess commissions would be paid to a company operated by McNally and
the other conspirators. Id.
99. Id. at 2878-79.
100. Id. at 2879. The Court stated: "Insofar as the sparse legislative history reveals anything,
it indicates that the original impetus behind the mail fraud statute was to protect the people
from schemes to deprive them of their money and property." Id. The Court appeared particularly
persuaded by Congress' amendment of the statute in 1909 adding the words "or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises" after
the original phrase "any scheme or artifice to defraud." Id. at 2880. The Court held that the
amendment signified Congress' intent to limit the reach of the statute. Id. at 2881. In a spirited
dissent, Justice Stevens attacked the majority's reasoning by contending the phrases are inde-
pendent, and had been construed as independent by every court to consider the matter. Id. at
2884 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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government.10 1 The Court held that the lack of a clear and definite
expression by Congress to extend the reach of the statutes to schemes
involving deprivation of intangible rights provided no other possible
construction.Ie 2
By explicitly limiting the scope of the wire and mail fraud statutes
to property rights, the McNally court cast doubt on a long line of
wire and mail fraud cases which had not required proof of property
loss.103 In addition, the Supreme Court failed to define what property
rights were protected under the statutes. Consequently, the definition
of "protected" property after McNally remained unclear. The Court's
opportunity to address the issue came in United States v. Carpenter.o4
II. TBn CASE
In United States v. Carpenter, an evenly divided United States
Supreme Court affirmed a Rule lOb-5 conviction of a Wall Street
Journal reporter.105 The affirmance, without opinion, upheld a re-
porter's conviction under the misappropriation theory for breaching a
duty not to disclose confidential business information.10 6 The Court
also unanimously affirmed the reporter's conviction under the wire
and mail fraud statutes for the same acts which gave rise to the Rule
10b-5 conviction.'0 7 The Court's opinion clarifies to a degree the
controversy surrounding the types of property protected under the
wire and mail fraud statutes.18
A. The Facts
R. Foster Winans was one of two writers working on a specialized
column of the Wall Street Journal entitled "Heard on the Street". 09
The column highlighted corporate stocks, analyzing volume, price
101. Id. at 2879.
102. Id. at 2880.
103. See Coyle, U.S. Prosecutors Reel in Wake of Mail Fraud Ruling, 9-45 NAT. L.J. 1(July 20, 1987) (assessment of impact of McNally on prosecutions under the wire and mail fraud
statutes).
104. 108 S. Ct. 316. See also infra notes 105-155 and accompanying text.
105. 108 S. Ct. at 320.
106. Id. at 320-21.
107. Id. at 320.
108. See infra notes 140-148 and accompanying text.
109. United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 108 S.Ct. 316 (1987).
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movement, and quality for investment purposes. 110 The Journal gave
Winans written guidelines concerning personal trading of securities by
the employees.' Pursuant to Journal regulations, the contents of all
articles were confidential and the sole property of the Journal before
publication." 2
Winans enlisted the assistance of another Journal employee, David
Carpenter, to contact a stockbroker about secretly selling the contents
and timing of the "Heard on the Street" column before publication."'
After several conversations with stockbroker Peter Brant, Winans
agreed to reveal the content and date of publication of future articles."
14
However, Brant and Winans agreed that Winans would not alter his
evaluation of any stock because of the agreement."' Based on Win-
ans'information, Brant and an associate at Kidder Peabody, Kenneth
Felis, bought and sold securities. 16 The net profit from their trading
amounted to $690,000 of which Winans received about $30,000.1 7
In November, 1983, the compliance department at Kidder Peabody
noticed a correlation between the recommendations of the published
"Heard" articles and the trading in the Felis and Brant accounts."
8
Simultaneously, Winans' supervisors at the Journal began questioning
him about his personal trading." 9 Winans denied ever having received
money from Brant. 2' The Securities Exchange Commission initiated a
formal investigation on March 14, 1984.121 Because of this investiga-
tion, the conspirators attempted to devise a explanation for the pay-
ments to Winans, but could not agree on a plan. 2 When the
conspirators began arguing over an appropriate explanation to the
SEC, Winans and Carpenter voluntarily went to the SEC and disclosed
the scheme.'2
110. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 830. Prior to beginning work on the column, Winans was
warned by the Journal about how the column's contents could affect trading and prices on the
stock market. Id.
111. Id. at 830.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 831-32.
114. Id. at 832.
115. Id. For his part in the scheme Winans was given an initial sum of $15,000 through a
check made out to Carpenter. Id. at 833.
116. Id. From October, 1983, until February, 1984, information from at least twenty-seven
articles was given to Brant and Fells in advance of publication. Id.
117. Id. at 834.
118. Id. at 835. On March 1, 1984, the Securities Exchange Commission contacted David
Clark who, unbeknownst to Winans, had been included in the scheme by Brant. Id. at 836.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 837.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 838. As part of a plea bargain agreement Brant became a witness for the
government. Id.
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The trial court found Winans and Fells guilty of securities fraud,
conspiracy to commit securities fraud, numerous violations of the wire
and mail fraud statutes, and conspiracy to commit wire and mail
fraud. 124 Carpenter was convicted of aiding and abetting Winans and
Felis. 125 The trial court found that Winans violated 10b-5 by misap-
propriating information obtained from his employment with the Jour-
nal. 126 Winans was also convicted of wire and mail fraud for breaching
his duty of confidentiality to his employer. 27 The trial court found
that Winans' concealment of his prepublication release of the contents
of the "Heard" column threatened the Journal's reputation, depriving
it of an intangible property right.' 28
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the convictions under
Rule 10b-5 and the wire and mail fraud statutes. 29 The court held that
Winans violated Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriated material non-
public information that he gained in the course of his employment and
sold it in violation of a fiduciary duty to his employer. 1" 0 The Court
of Appeals addressed Winans' wire and mail fraud convictions briefly
and held that the statutes could extend to protect confidentiality and
nonpublic information."' The Court of Appeals held that the scheme
to trade on the information attempted to deprive the Journal of its
intangible property right in confidential business information. 132 The
appellate court also held that the scheme was sufficient to sustain
convictions of wire and mail fraud because it anticipated the use of
the wire and mail services to distribute the Journal. 33
B. The Opinion
The Supreme Court divided evenly on Winans' violation of Rule
10b-5, affirming the lower court's application of the misappropriation
124. Id.
125. United States v. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316, 319 (1987).
126. Winans, 612 F. Supp. at 838.
127. Id. For his part, Winans was sentenced to 18 months in prison, 5 years probation, 400
hours community service and fined $5,000. Id.
128. Id. at 836.
129. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1026 (1986), aff "d, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
130. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1034-35. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that Winans' concealment
of his prepublication release threatened harm to the Journal's reputation. Id.
133. Id.
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theory without opinion.134 However, the Supreme Court unanin-
mously upheld the conspirators' convictions of wire and mail fraud.1
35
In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court held that
intangible property rights are protected by the wire and mail fraud
statutes. 136 First, the Supreme Court held that the publication schedule
and contents of the Heard on the Street column were the property
of the Journal and protected by the wire and mail fraud statutes.
37
Second, the Court held the activities of the group constituted a
scheme to defraud the Journal as defined by the statutes.1 38 Finally,
the Court held the fact that the Journal used the wire and mail
services was sufficient to satisfy the statutes' purposeful use of the
mails requirement.
39
1. Intangible Property Rights
The principle issue presented to the Supreme Court involved de-
fining the types of property interests protected by the wire and mail
fraud statutes."Y° In McNally, the Supreme Court stated the wire and
mail fraud statutes were limited in scope to the protection of property
rights but failed to define which types of property interests were
protected by the statutes.' 4' The defendants in Carpenter argued that
the Journal's interest in prepublication confidentiality was too ethe-
real to be considered a property right and therefore was not protected
by the statutes. 42 Additionally, the defendants argued that the statutes
were not designed to protect a mere injury to reputation.
43
The Carpenter Court clarified McNally and explained that McNally
did not limit the scope of the statutes' protection to only tangible
property rights. 4 The Carpenter court found that confidential in-
134. United States v. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987). The Court stated: "The Court
is evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the securities laws and for that reason
affurms the judgment below on those counts." Id.
135. Id. at 316.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 321.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 322.
140. Id. at 320.
141. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879. The Court also stated the statutes did
not extend to schemes to defraud citizens of the intangible right to fair and impartial government.
Id.
142. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320.
143. Id.
144. Id. The Court stated: "McNally did not limit the scope of § 1341 to tangible as
distinguished from intangible property rights." Id.
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formation compiled in the course of business is a "recognized"
property right. 145 The Court observed that the intangible nature ofbusiness information did not make it any less protected by the
statutes. 46 Accordingly, the Court held that the Journal had a
property right in keeping the timing and contents of the "Heard on
the Street" column confidential before publication. 147 By selling the
contents and the information as to the timing of the column in
advance of publication, Winans deprived the Journal of its property
rights to confidentiality and exclusive use of confidential business
information. 148
2. Scheme to Defraud
After determining that Winans had deprived the Journal of aprotected property right, the Court addressed whether the conspira-
tors' activities amounted to a scheme to defraud as proscribed by
the wire and mall fraud statutes.149 Reiterating the broad definition
of fraud under the statutes, the Court agreed with the appellate court
and found that Winans breached his fiduciary duty by violating his
agreement with the Journal.'50 The Court observed that Winans
employment with the Journal constituted an undertaking that he not
reveal prepublication information about his column and observed
that this undertaking occurs whether or not the employment agree-
ment is in writing.'5' Therefore, the conspiracy to deprive the Journal
145. Id. (citing RuckeIshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) and Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646 (1983)).
146. Id. The Court noted that confidential news information has been recognized hs property,quoting language from International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918):[News matter, however little susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute
sense, is stock and trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill,labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold to those who will pay money for
it, as for any other merchandise.
Id. at 321.
147. Id. at 321-22.
148. Id. at 321. The Court also dismissed the defendants' argument that they did not interfere
with the Journal's use of the information or deprive the Journal of the first public use of theinformation. The Court stated the loss of exclusive use was enough, "for exclusivity is animportant aspect of confidential business information and most private property for that matter."Id. It should be noted that the Court failed to address in its opinion the defendant's argument
that mere reputation is not a protectable property right under the statutes.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. The Court quoted Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980), stating that
"even in the absence of a written contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect
confidential information obtained during the course of his employment." Carpenter, 108 S. Ct.
at 321.
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of its confidential information was a scheme to defraud within the
proscription of the wire and mail fraud statutes.
52
3. Use of the Wire and Mail Services
The conspirators argued that the Journal's use of the wires and
mail to print and send the Journal to its customers did not satisfy
the statutory requirement that those sevices be used to execute the
scheme. 15  The Court dismissed the conspirators' claim and agreed
with the trial and appellate courts that circulation of the Journal was
not only anticipated but an essential part of the scheme. 5 4 The Court
observed that if the column had not been available to the Journal's
customers through the mail and wire services there would have been
no effect on stock prices and no likelihood of profiting from Winans'
breach of confidentiality.Y
5
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. Rule 1Ob-5
The decision, by an equally divided court, upholding Carpenter's
securities fraud conviction under Rule lOb-5 only affirms the decision
of the appellate court: it is, therefore, of no precedential value.
15 6
At a bare minimum, however, it appears that four Justices 57 would
approve the use of the misappropriation theory in situations involving
misuse of confidential information.5 8 It remains an open question
whether the four votes against affirming Winans' Rule lOb-5
conviction'59 signal disapproval of the misappropriation as an unjus-
152. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 321.
153. Id. at 322.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1972) (affirmance by even split not considered
an actual adjudication of the case). See also Ohio ex reL Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264
(1960) (affirmance by an equally divided court not entitled to precedential weight).
157. Although the exact vote was not disclosed, one commentator suggests the four votes in
favor of upholding the conviction were Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun.
LANoEVOORT, supra note 9, at 185.
158. See supra note 58 (discussion of the concurring and dissenting opinions in Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1979).
159. According to Langevoort's analysis the four Justices voting against use of the misap-
propriation theory were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Cormer, Scalia, and White. See
supra, note 157.
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tified extension of Chiarella or disapproval with the application of
the theory to the unusual facts of Carpenter.160 A reconsideration of
the issue by all nine justices of the Supreme Court is likely, given
that only four votes are needed to grant certiorari. Presumably,
newly appointed Justice Anthony M. Kennedy would be in a position
to break the tie should the issue arise again. Given Justice Kennedy's
penchant for stare decisis and deference to the legislature it is arguable
that he would side with those members of the Court who do not
approve of extending liability under Rule lOb-5 to situations like
those in Carpenter.
Whatever the effect of the Carpenter ruling, enough confusion
remains surrounding the applicability of Rule 10b-5 to the nontra-
ditional insider to warrant congressional action. 16' Until the enactment
of new legislation or a change in case law, the government has stated
that it will continue to use the misappropriation theory against those
involved in insider trading. 62
B. Wire and Mail Fraud
Carpenter will have important ramifications for future prosecutions
against fiduciary fraud, theft of intangible property, and securities
fraud under the wire and mail fraud statutes.6 3 Although McNally's
"property" rule was seen as a devastating blow to federal prosecu-
tors, potentially resulting in the reversal of dozens of convictions, 64
160. LANGEvooRT, supra note 9, at 185.
161. Nash, Insider Definition In New Law Urged, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1987, at D10, col.
I (east coast ed.).
162. See Labaton, Giuliani Sees Cases Aiding Prosecution, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1987 atD10, col. 6 (east coast ed.). "Rudolph W. Guilani, the United States Attorney in Manhattan,
said yesterday that the United States Supreme Court's ruling against R. Foster Winans meant
that his office 'was free to go ahead now' with insider trading cases." Id. See also supra notes51-61 and accompanying text (discussion of the Second Circuit's expansion of misappropriation
theory).
163. The government's unfettered access to the wire and mail fraud statutes in cases involvingfiduciary fraud as approved by Carpenter arguably renders the misappropriation controversy
moot. Federal prosecutors can reach many types of securities fraud and exact significant penalties
without proving a Rule lOb-5 violation. All that need be shown is that the defendant gainedinformation in breach of a fiduciary duty which deprived another party of intangible property
and purchased securities based on that information. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316,
321 (1987).
164. See Coyle, U.S. Prosecutors Reel in Wake of Mail Fraud Ruling, Nat'l L. J., July 20,1987, at 1, col. 2. One Justice Department Official estimated that at least 185 convictions and
another 100 cases under investigation at the time could be affected by McNally. See Note, MailFraud: Termination of the "Intangible Rights" Doctrine-McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct.2875 (1987), 11 HA~v. J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 286, 294. See, e.g., United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d
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Carpenter's explanation of McNally lessens McNally's impact. 165
However, in addition to approving wire and mail fraud prosecutions
for misuse of intangible property, the Carpenter Court also suggested
the possibility that federal prosecutors could file new charges using
the intangible property rights theory in many of those cases reversed
under McNally. 66 The degree to which Carpenter will extend the
scope of wire and mail fraud liability remains to be seen.
The most extreme interpretation of Carpenter suggests the decision
may extend the wire and mail fraud statutes by criminalizing breaches
of confidence in the employer-employee relationship. 167 Under this
view, by criminalizing the misuse of information in schemes to
defraud, Carpenter gives employers the ability to report theft of
corporate trade secrets to a federal prosecutor. 68 Additionally, Car-
penter may provide employers the ability to retaliate against an
employee who reports an employer's securities law violation to au-
thorities by asserting the employee has leaked confidential informa-
tion. 69 Also, employees who want to change employers within the
same field may find their movement hampered by the threat of a
wire and mail fraud prosecution if they gain employment with a
* competitor of their former employer. 70 Finally, by basing the decision
on the employer-employee relationship, the Court's opinion gives the
employer the option to decide whether an employee's conduct will
be prosecuted as a federal crime or as simple theft.
171
These concerns about Carpenter's potential effects make it imper-
ative that future cases under the wire and mail fraud statutes are
limited to appropriate instances. Courts should be careful to insure
that all of the elements of the wire and mail fraud statutes are
621 (7th Cir. 1987) (indictment charging attorney with scheme to deprive Treasury Department
of information not offense under wire and mail fraud statutes after McNally).
165. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
166. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320. See, e.g., McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2882. In McNally, the
jury was charged it could find the defendants guilty for defrauding the citizens of their right to
have government affairs conducted honestly. Id. at 2878-79. The Court intimated that had the
government alleged the loss of control over how government money was spent the result might
have been different. Id. at 2882. In his dissent, Justice Stevens went further, stating "Even
without Congressional action, prosecutions of corrupt officials who use the mails to further their
schemes may continue since it will frequently be possible to prove some loss of money or
property." Id. at 290 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Labaton, Decision Seen as Bar to Leaks, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1987, at Dl, col. 5
(national ed.).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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established before allowing a conviction to stand. 172 Regardless of
how far courts extend the definition of intangible property or the
scope of the phrase "scheme to defraud" under the wire and mail
fraud statutes, a successful prosecution requires proof of specific
intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt. 73 Therefore, innocent
acts involving an employee's use of corporate information could not
give rise to criminal prosecution. In addition, the pragmatic problems
an employer would face trying to interest a United States Attorney
to prosecute a simple case of employee theft under the statutes would
prevent all but the most extensive criminal schemes from being
prosecuted. Of course, Carpenter requires a deprivation of some
property 74 and problems of proof of loss may prevent many cases
from being brought at the outset.
A more persuasive view of the effects of Carpenter is that the
opinion did not so much open new vistas for criminal prosecution
as make clear that prosecutors can confidently continue to use the
wire and mail fraud statutes against schemes to deprive others of
intangible forms of property. 175 Although Carpenter confirms Mc-
Nally's rule that intangible rights of honest and faithful government
are not actionable under the wire and mail fraud statutes, 176 the
Court did not approve the unbridled use of federal law to attack
every fraudulent scheme using the mails. In addition, the Court's
consistent application of the requirement that the wire or mail
mediums "be used to execute the scheme,'1 77 suggests that a convic-
tion would not stand under the "foreseeably contemplated use of
the mails" doctrine which existed prior to Carpenter.78
172. In Carpenter the Court stated, "We have little trouble in holding that the conspiracyhere to trade on the Journal's confidential information is not outside the reach of the wire and
mail fraud statutues, provided the other elements of the offenses are satisfied." (emphasis added).
United States v. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987).
173. See United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005-06 (2d Cir. 1980) (mail fraud statute
requires some misuse of property), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Bohonus,
628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980) (same).174. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320 (quoting McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987)
that the mail fraud statute ... is "limited in scope to the protection of property...").
175. Stewart & Wermiel, High Court Upholds Conviction of Winans, Two Conspirators,
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 7.
176. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320.
177. Id. at 322. The Court stated, "The courts below were quite right in observing that
circulation of the 'Heard' column was not only anticipated but an essential part of the scheme."
Id.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Muni, 668 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1981) (knowledge that use of
mails was a normal and customary part of the business sufficient to satisfy use of the malls
requirment).
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However, the Carpenter Court's decision that the wire and mail
fraud statutes protect intangible rights without defining what those
property rights encompass reopens the question many thought was
settled in McNally.17 9 By finding an employee liable for breach of a
fiduciary duty which deprived his employer of something other than
money or tangible property, while at the same time reaffirming
McNally's "no fraud for breach of intangible rights to honest gov-
ernment" rule, the Carpenter opinion seems to suggest that public
officials who defraud citizens should be treated differently than
employees of private businesses. 180 Absent a policy reason to justify
this distinction, courts confronted with this situation in the future
should refuse to accept facially the argument that McNally and
Carpenter deny application of the wire and mail fraud statutes to
public officials. Instead, Carpenter should be seen as clarifying
McNally's loss of property requirement.
Although the wire and mail fraud statutes now clearly apply to
most cases involving insider trading and fraudulent misuse of infor-
mation by employees, Carpenter alone does nothing to improve the
remedies available to the defrauded party.181 Because only the SEC
or other government agencies can prosecute securities fraud under
the wire and mail fraud statutes, parties defrauded by insider trading
practices or by breach of a confidential relationship must look to
other remedies for damage recoveries. 182 This lack of damage remedy
may be overcome through the use of other federal statutes after
Carpenter.183
C. Civil RICO
One statutory scheme that defrauded parties may invoke is RICO.1
84
Congress originally enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO) to attack the infiltration of
179. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
180. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320.
181. Labaton, Giuliani Sees Cases Aiding Prosecution, N. Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1987, at D10,
col. 6 (east coast ed.).
182. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975). Only a purchaser
or seller of securities may bring a claim against the defrauding party under Rule lOb-5. Therefore,
victims of fraud who did not purchase or sell securities because of the fraud must look to other
remedies. Id.
183. See supra notes 184-205 and accompanying text.
184. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
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legitimate business by organized crime.8 5 Currently, many RICO
claims are filed not against persons associated with criminal organi-
zations, but against otherwise legitimate businesspersons.186
RICO provides both civil 87 and criminal'8  sanctions for various
acts which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity or investment
of income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity. 8 9 Under
the civil remedy of RICO, any party suffering an injury to business
or property due to racketeering injury may recover damages. 90 How-
ever, proving the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity for
the purposes of civil liability requires more than just establishing the
commission of two or more "predicate acts."' 9' The injured party
must establish that these predicate acts are part of a continuing
course of criminal conduct. 92
Included in the list of predicate acts, which can constitute a pattern
of racketeering, are violations of the wire and mail fraud statutes. 93
185. Note, Civil RICO is a Misnomer: The Need for Criminal Procedural Protections in
Actions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 100 HARv. L. Rnv. 1288, 1290 (1987).
186. Id.
187. Title 18, section 1964 of the United States Code provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of Section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(e) (1982).
188. See id. § 1963 (criminal sanctions for violations of RICO's substantive provisions).
189. Title 18, section 1963 of the United States Code provides:
It shall be unlawful;
(a) ... for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly,
from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce ...
(b) ... for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity ... to acquire or
maintain ... any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) ... for any person employed or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity ...
(d) ... for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a),
(b), or (c) of this section ....
Id. § 1962.
190. Abrams, The Civil RICO Controversy Reaches the Supreme Court, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv.
147, 152. A racketeering injury is any injury caused by a pattern of racketeering as defined by
18 U.S.C. 1962(1). This tautalogical explanantion is ambiguous at best and has been the subject
of extensive court interpretation. Id. at 152 n.28.
191. Id. at 177. A predicate act is any of the numerous criminal acts proscribed by the RICO
statues. Examples include murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, extortion, and wire and mail
fraud. Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(1) (1982) (list of activities constituting "racketeering injury").
192. Abrams, supra note 190, at 177.
193. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
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Since violations of the wire and mail fraud statutes often involve
schemes to deprive others of property, 194 a continuing course of
criminal conduct could be readily established. Consequently, a private
party may bring a civil RICO action for damages resulting to a
business from a frudulent wire and mail fraud scheme.
195
RICO is an extremely attractive alternative for the private litigant
for several reasons. First, civil RICO imposes treble damages upon
the defrauding party and provides for the award of court costs and
attorney's fees. 196 Second, no prior criminal conviction of the under-
lying predicate acts is necessary under civil RICO. 197 Third, the burden
of proof required to establish the predicate acts is by a preponderance
of the evidence, even though the predicate act is criminal in nature.198
Finally, civil RICO allows the litigant to bring suit in federal court
and append state claims. 199 In some jurisdictions (notably California),
litigants may bring a civil RICO action in state court along with
other state causes of action under the doctrine of concurrent juris-
diction. 200
Until the advent of civil RICO, private litigants had no access to
the wire and mail fraud statutes. However, after Carpenter's deter-
mination that an employee's breach of duty to an employer could
violate the wire and mail fraud statute, actions that in the past could
not be litigated in a civil forum can now serve as the predicate acts
for civil RICO. 20 1 Therefore, schemes that involve insider trading or
employee misuse of confidential information and which constitute a
violation of the wire and mail fraud statutes will create a private
cause of action for stockholders and employers. 20 2 If this view of
civil RICO prevails, the statute could create a federal cause of action
for victims of common law fraud.203 Similarly, a business could bring
194. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987); United States v. Newman,
664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
195. Abrams, supra note 190, at 179.
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
197. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).
198. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 815 F.2d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 1987). See also
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 279 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2247 (1986); Note, supra note 185, at 1290.
199. Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 469
U.S. 1157.
200. Clanci v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 3d 903, 710 P.2d 375, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1985).
201. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1280 (1984).
202. See supra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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an action under civil RICO for injury to reputation. Not only would
the sanctions be potentially severe for the defendant, but also the
use of the wire and mail fraud statutes, in conjunction with civil
RICO, could brand the losing party a criminal and a racketeer
without affording him the protections of due process of law. 204 These
possible results would be beyond anything Congress could have
imagined when these statutes were enacted and give some credence
to the cries of commentators asking the Court to limit the breadth
of civil RICO. 2 5
CONCLUSION
In United States v. Carpenter, the United States Supreme Court
split evenly on whether a financial reporter violates Rule 10b-5 by
selling the contents and timing of his stock analysis column prior to
publication with the knowledge that the column will affect the stock
market when released. 206 The decision places the legality of the
misappropriation theory in question and raises the need for Congress
to resolve the issue.
Additionally, the Supreme Court held that a financial reporter
violates the wire and mail fraud statutes by defrauding his employer
of confidential business information.207 The Court determined that
the wire and mail fraud statutes protect intangible property rights as
well as tangible property.208 However, the Court reiterated the rule
that the wire and mail fraud statutes do not prohibit public servants
from defrauding citizens of the intangible right to honest and faithful
government. 209 This extension of the wire and mail fraud statutes to
intangible property has two significant effects. First, many convic-
tions of public officials which were overturned because they did not
satisfy the McNally "property" requirement can be retried if the
government can allege the citizens were defrauded of "intangible
property." Second, a defrauded party may now use the statutes to
establish a civil RICO claim and recover damages for a breach of
confidentiality that injures business reputation. These effects create
204. See Note, supra note 185, at 1290-91 (discussing cases where defendant of civil RICO
found not entitled to criminal procedural protections).
205. See, e.g., Note, supra note 185; Abrams, supra note 190.
206. United States v. Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987).
207. Id. at 321.
208. Id. at 320.
209. Id.
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the need for Congressional review of the wire and mail fraud statutes
and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations statutes.
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